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STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS:
AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
David L. Dickinson and Ronald L. Oaxaca

ABSTRACT

Statistical discrimination occurs when distinctions between demographic groups are
made on the basis of real or imagined statistical distinctions between the groups. While such
discrimination is legal in some cases (e.g., insurance markets), it is illegal and/or controversial in
others (e.g., racial profiling and gender-based labor market discrimination). "First moment"
statistical discrimination occurs when, for example, female workers are offered lower wages
because females are perceived to be less productive, on average, than male workers. "Second
moment" discrimination occurs when risk averse employers offer female workers lower wages
based not on lower average productivity but on a higher variance in their productivity. Empirical
work on statistical discrimination is hampered by the difficulty of obtaining suitable data from
naturally-occurring labor markets.

This paper reports results from controlled laboratory

experiments designed to study second moment statistical discrimination in a labor market setting.
Since decision-makers may not view risk in the same way as economists or statisticians (i.e.,
risk = variance of distribution), we also examine two possible alternative measures of risk: the
support of the distribution, and the probability of earning less than the expected (maximum)
profits for the employer. Our results indicate that individuals do respond to these alternative
measures of risk, and employers made statistically discriminatory wage offers consistent with
loss-aversion in our full sample (though differences between male and female employers can be
noted). If one can transfer these results outside of the laboratory, they indicate that labor market
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discrimination based only on first moment discrimination is biased downward. The public policy
implication is that efforts and legislation aimed at reducing discrimination of various sorts face
an additional challenge in trying to identify and limit relatively hidden, but significant, forms of
statistical discrimination.

STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS:
AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS!

Introduction

When membership in a particular group conveys valuable information about an
individual's skills, productivity, or other characteristics, an agent with no personal prejudice may
still find it rational to statistically discriminate. Examples of statistical discrimination appear in a
variety of settings such as wage or hiring decisions in labor markets, racial profiling in law
enforcement, determinants of loan approval rates, differential premia for insurance, or even
choosing friends or new church members. In some settings, statistical discrimination is legal and
acceptable (e.g., insurance rates), whereas in other settings it is controversial and/or illegal (e.g.,
racial profiling and employment discrimination). Existing research on statistical discrimination
has focused on 1st-moment statistical discrimination. That is, discriminatory wage offers to
females or lower loan approval rates for individuals from minority racial groups are based on
average productivity and default rates, respectively. Agents attribute the average characteristics

of the group to each individual from that group when it is costly to gather information.
In this paper, we explore the possibility that statistical discrimination extends beyond

differential treatment based on average group characteristics. Specifically, discrimination may
also exist if agents base decisions on the riskiness of the distribution of group productivity (or
default rate, accident rate, etc.). Using labor markets as an example, employers may make lower
wage offers to females based on a higher productivity variance, even though average
productivity may be identical to male employee productivity. If such variance-based statistical

IThe authors are grateful for research funding made possible by the McClelland Professorship. Valuable
comments were provided by Bob Slonim and participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in Tucson.
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discrimination is empirically documented, then existing measures of statistical discrimination are
under-estimated and measures of prejudiced-based discrimination may be over-stated. In other
words, some discrimination labeled as personal prejudice or taste-based may really be just a
different form of statistical discrimination than what is typically examined.
We report results from a controlled laboratory experiment in which subjects are engaged
as employers and workers in a laboratory double-auction labor market. Four labor productivity
distribution treatments are examined. In a given treatment, all workers belong to the labor pool
and labor productivity is determined by an ex post random draw with probabilities based on the
common knowledge productivity distribution. The productivity distribution of the labor pool
differs across treatments, but average productivity is constant across all treatments. We find that
subject-employers make significantly different wage offers as a result of various measures of risk
that do not alter the average productivity of workers. The implication of our results is that
statistical discrimination may be more pervasive than previously thought.

Statistical Discrimination

Statistical theories of discrimination have been advanced by Arrow (1972), Phelps
(1972), Aigner and Cain (1977), and Lundberg and Startz (1983). Some studies base statistical
discrimination on noisier productivity signals for certain worker groups, while others base it on
imperfect or incomplete information. Lang (1986) argues that statistical discrimination can be
caused also by a differential cost of communication with different groups-the minority group
would bear the cost of the communication. In a somewhat similar vein, Cornell and We1ch
(1996) argue that statistical discrimination can result from a filtering situation in which
employers, for example, find it less costly to assess workers with similar backgrounds to the
employer's, thus creating "screening" discrimination. Most researchers advance theories that
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depend on differences in average productivity characteristics, although others note that statistical
discrimination need not be based on differences in average productivity (e.g., Aigner and Cain,
1977; Curley and Yates, 1985; the latter considers that the range of a probability distribution
affects individual preferences).

For risk-averse individuals, it seems clear that a less-risky

outcome distribution would be preferred to a more risky distribution, although the riskiness of an
outcome distribution may be defined in several different ways.
Empirical evidence alluding to statistical discrimination can be found in a variety of
settings, though it is often difficult to identify taste-based versus statistical discrimination (see
discussion in Arrow, 1998).

Probably the only easily observable forms of statistical

discrimination are the legal forms, such as those found in the insurance industry.

In labor

markets, observable marginal productivity is required to correctly identify statistical
discrimination. There is some direct evidence from employer interviews that race is used as a
proxy in employment decisions (Wilson, 1996). Neumark (1999) uses field data to show that
discrimination not based on productivity characteristics is observed, and it is attributed to poorer
information about the discriminated-against group. In contrast, Altonji and Pierret (2001) utilize
an econometric technique designed to identify statistical discrimination, and find little evidence
for statistical discrimination based on race.
In credit markets it is illegal for lenders to discriminate against borrowers of a protected

class, even if class turned out to be a good proxy for unobservable risk factors. Ladd (1998)
reports evidence consistent with at least some amount of statistical discrimination in mortgage
lending. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) and Goldberg (1996) use an audit study approach to
examine discrimination in price negotiations at new car dealerships. The data reveal statistical
discrimination, the argument being that dealers may infer different reservation values on
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individuals buyers based on their race or gender. Similarly, List (2003) examines statistical
discrimination in sports cards markets and finds that statistical discrimination explains observed
differences in negotiations with minorities better than does prejudiced-based discrimination.
Race also appears to affect law enforcement decisions (Applebaum, 1996), as is noted in the
discussion in Loury (1998), who also emphasizes the difficulty in attributing causation to such
race-based decisions.
Given some of the identification and causation issues inherent in field data approaches to
examining discrimination, some have used controlled experiments to examine statistically-based
discrimination.

Anderson and Haupert (1999) examine statistical discrimination where

employers must decide whether or not to purchase additional information on workers (i.e.,
statistical discrimination based on imperfect information). Davis (1987) shows how maximal
quality selection may imply that groups from which the employer draws fewer observations may
lead to an inference of lower average productivity. Thus, statistical discrimination is shown to
result from an incorrect inference about the productivity distribution of certain groups of
workers.

Finally, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) examine behavior in simple economIC

experiments and find evidence that (incorrect) ethnic stereotypes-a type of statistical
discrimination-are responsible for some of the observed patterns in the data.
Our paper adopts a laboratory approach to examine more hidden forms of statistical
discrimination that are often difficult to examine from field data. Rather than study first-moment
statistical discrimination, we focus on statistical discrimination that is more difficult examine in
the field. Average worker productivity in our experiment is identical, but what differs across
treatments is "riskiness" of the worker-group's productivity. Our focus is motivated by existing
research that shows the potential importance on cognitive assessment of risk of not only the
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distributional variance, but also the support of the distribution (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973;
Curley and Yates, 1985; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Babcock et aI, 1995) and the potential for
loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).

While others have found field evidence of statistical

discrimination based on higher-order moments of a distribution (e.g., Ayers and Siegelman,
1995; Goldberg, 1996; List, 2003), our contribution is that we examine multiple measures of
distributional risk, not just distributional variance. Additionally, our approach provides a more
controlled environment in which to precisely manipulate the productivity distribution of the
workers. Though this approach is less externally valid than field experiments or audit studies,
the trade-off is necessary in order to precisely manipulate the "risk" variable in our design.
We employ a full information environment to examine the existence of higher-order
statistical discrimination. Average worker productivity is identical, causation can only go one
direction in our design, and the market institution for determining wage contracts is one that
produces strong convergence to the competitive equilibrium prediction. Nevertheless, we find
evidence for statistical discrimination based on distinct measures of riskiness of the worker-pool
productivity distribution.

Experimental Design

We implement a two-sided auction market design to simulate a labor market. Workers
are more plentiful than employers and so there is an equilibrium level of "unemployment" in this
design. Both supply and demand for labor are induced upon the experimental subjects using
standard experimental techniques discussed in Smith (1982).
The baseline design we use is simple in that it generates clear equilibrium predictions.
Specifically, the demand side of the experimental market consists of 5 employers, each capable
of hiring one unit of labor in each experimental market round. The productivity of a unit of labor
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in the baseline (treatment 1) is certain and fixed at 3 units of output (each unit of output sells for
$1 experimental), and so the demand for labor is perfectly elastic at $3.00 up to 5 units of labor.
The supply side of the market consists of 10 workers, each with reservation wage of $.50, and
each able to sell at most one unit of labor services in each experimental market round. As such,
the supply curve is perfectly elastic at $.50 up until 10 units of labor. The predicted market wage
is $.50, and the predicted market quantity of labor traded is 5 units. We used the labels such as
"worker," "employer," and "wages to facilitate the subjects' understanding of the connection
between productivity and final payoff, but it was clear to all subjects that no labor task would be
completed in the experiment. In this way, we maintain strict control over productivity in the
experiment. Figure 1 shows the experimental design graphically.
The baseline experimental design is quite similar to that used in Smith (1965), though
Smith does not use a labor market context.

In our design the employers are not given

information on worker reservation wages, and workers are not informed as to the value (to
employers) of a unit of output. Payoff information is therefore private to each subject as in
Smith (1965), who shows that, even when market surplus at equilibrium is designed to be
extremely imbalanced, this trading institution produces strong convergence of equilibrium prices
to the competitive equilibrium prediction.
uncertain productivity treatments

Any evidence of statistical discrimination in the

would then be significant given the strong competitive

tendencies inherent in our baseline design.
The stochastic or uncertain productivity treatments are labeled treatments 2, 3, and 4.
The difference across these uncertain productivity treatments lies in the particular (known)
productivity distribution for the labor pool.

After hiring a unit of labor in an uncertain

productivity treatment the employer discovers the realized productivity of that unit of labor by
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means of an ex post random draw. Specifically, in treatment 2, productivity of the labor pool is
either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 units of output with probability 10%, 10%, 60%, 10%, and 10%,
respectively.

Productivity is determined by a random draw from a Bingo cage, and an

independent draw is conducted for each employer who hires a unit of labor.

Though wage

contracts are made with a specific experimental subject in any given trading round, it is made
clear that productivity draws are independent of the actual worker-subject (i.e., you cannot
contract in the next round with John Doe to ensure productivity of 5 just because it happened to
tum out that way in the current or past rounds when contracting with John Doe).

The

independence of the productivity draw from the specific worker-subject controls for differences
that employers in naturally occurring work environments would have in sorting and selecting
workers from a given labor pool. We simply assume that employers are equal on this dimension,
and so hiring any specific worker from a given pool of workers with a specific productivity
distribution is similar to taking a random draw from the productivity distribution.
Treatments 3 and 4 also involve uncertain productivity distributions of the labor pool, but
they differ from treatment 2 in terms of the specific distribution. In treatment 3, productivity of
the labor pool is either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 units of output with probability 20% for each possible
outcome. In treatment 4, productivity of the labor pool is either 2 or 4 units of output with
probability 50% for each.
The expected competitive employer profit is $2.50 experimental dollars smce the
expected revenue is $3.00 and the competitive wage is $0.50. There were a total of seven
experimental sessions in which the order of the treatments was randomized. Each of the four
treatments in an experimental session lasted four periods. There were a total of 35 employers in
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our experiment, and we observe wage contracts for each employer a total of sixteen times.
Hence, we have a panel with 560 observations.
Table 1 describes the experimental design in terms of how each of the treatments varies
with respect to various measures of productivity distribution risk.

This design allows us to

examine several candidate variables for statistical discrimination: discrimination based on the
variance of labor productivity, based on the support of the productivity distribution, or based on
the probability of less-than-expected competitive profits for the employer. A comparison of
wage contracts in treatment 1 to treatments 2, 3, and 4 allows us to test these different
hypotheses of statistical discrimination. Binary comparisons among treatments 2, 3, and 4 allow
us to look at the joint effects of varying combinations of variance, support, and probability of
less-than-expected competitive profits for the employer. The difference between treatment 3 and
treatment 2 reflects the joint effects of a higher variance and greater probability of less-thanexpected profits in treatment 3. The difference between treatment 4 and treatment 2 reflects the
joint effects of a smaller support and a greater probability of less-than-expected profits in
treatment 4. Finally, the difference between treatment 4 and treatment 3 reflects the joint effects
of a smaller variance, a smaller support, and a greater probability of less-than-expected profits in
treatment 4.

Results

Our results are summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4. In Table 2, we use dummy variables to
control for the uncertainty productivity treatments 2, 3, and 4. The results are random effects
estimates, which account for differences in wage contracts across employers and possible
correlation in the error terms across rounds for an individual employer's wage contracts. This
random effects specification seems a reasonable approach to our panel data. OLS estimation is
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rejected in favor of fixed effects and random effects. However, given our particular design, the
coefficient estimates from the random effects specification are identical to those from a fixed
effects or an ordinary least squares estimation with a single constant tenns (see the Appendix for
details). The random effects and fixed effects estimator for the treatment effects are identical
and differ from OLS only in the estimated standard errors.
The Table 2 results show that, for the full sample, treatments 3 and 4 significantly lower
wage contracts offered to workers, but the results from the gender-specific sample show that this
is due entirely to the behavior of the male employers. Male employers offered significantly
lower wage contracts in each of the 3 uncertain productivity treatments relative to certain
productivity of workers in treatment 1.

The largest decrease in wage contract occurred in

treatment 4 for the male sample, in which wage contracts were 21 cents lower than in the certain
productivity treatment. This amount is about 32% lower given the average wage contract level
of about 65 cents). Female employers, on the other hand, did not offer significantly different
wages across treatments. This is consistent with female employers being risk neutral.
Table 3 presents treatment effects comparisons from within the uncertain productivity
treatments. Treatment 3 versus treatment 2 picks up the combined effects of greater variance and
probability of less-than-expected profits. These combined effects are negative in all cases but
statistically significant only for the full sample and the female sample. Treatment 4 versus
treatment 2 reflects the combined effect of the smaller support but higher probability of lessthan-expected profits in treatment 4. In all cases the combined effect is negative and statistically
significant.

This reflects the dominance of the loss aversion motive.

Treatment 4 versus

treatment 3 picks up the joint effect of a lower variance, a smaller support, and a higher
probability of less-than-expected profits in treatment 4. The joint effect was negative in all cases
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but statistically significant only for the male employer sample. Apparently for males the loss
aversion motive dominates both of the other measures of lower risk when comparing treatment 4
with treatment 3.
Though these results presented thus far offer some initial evidence of statistical
discrimination based on a measure of distributional risk, it is also the case that the treatment
effects specification does not strictly control for differences in the productivity distribution's
variance, support, or probability of below average profits. This follows from the fact that certain
treatments vary more than one of these distributional characteristics (see Table 1).

In

formulating our statistical design, we had not originally considered the loss aversion factor
associated with the variation in the probability of less-than expected profits. We therefore also
estimate a model using explicit controls for individual changes in each of these distributional
characteristics in Table 4.
In Table 4 wage contracts are regressed on variables for variance, support, and loss

probability variable, where loss probability is measured relative to expected (competitive)
profits. As in Table 2, the Table 4 results are from a random effects specification, and results are
presented for the entire employer sample as well as the gender-based employer subsamples. 2
From Table 4 we can see that for the overall sample, the only significant predictor of wage
contract differences is the probability of profits less than average. The magnitude of Loss Prob
at -.25 indicates, for example, that wage contracts were 12.5 cents lower in treatment 4 and in
treatment 1 (19% lower given estimated average wage contracts of 65 cents in treatment 1).
Results for male versus female employer wage contracts again show intriguing
differences in individual's response to the incentives of the different productivity distributions.

2As before, the random effects estimates are identical to those from fIxed effects or OLS specifIcations due
to our particular design, though the estimated standard errors will differ (see Appendix) .
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Male employers significantly decreased wage contracts in the Loss Prob treatment (by about
33%), while female employers did not significantly alter wage contracts in response to a change
in the probability of less-than-average profits. Female employers did, however, offer higher
wage contracts to workers in the treatments with a larger difference between highest and lowest
possible worker productivity. This is somewhat puzzling, and it is consistent with risk preferring
behavior that is at odds with earlier evidence consistent with risk neutrality among female
employers. Male employers offered significantly lower wage contracts the larger the distribution
support, though this result is marginally insignificant. Neither gender of employer significantly
altered wage contracts as the variance in the productivity distributions changed (again the result
is only marginally insignificant for male employers).
Our experimental data indicate that males may react more significantly to distinct
measure of the riskiness of the productivity distribution than females.

Overall, what is

significant is that we find evidence for statistical discrimination in our sample that is not based
on average group differences. Considering this labor market example, our full data sample show
evidence that one variable in particular-a higher potential for less-than-average payoffs-can
significantly decrease the wage that an employer would pay to individuals from the more risky
labor pool.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has examined a very simple framework for second-moment statistical
discrimination.

Despite the strong competitive equilibrium convergence properties of the

double-auction institution, we were able to uncover indications of statistical discrimination,
mainly among male employers. At this point we have no explanation as to why there should be a
gender difference. Although we do not report the results here, we also examined whether or not
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the gender composition of the contract pair had any effect. The results showed that gender
composition of the contract pair had no effect.
The next step in this line of research is to have two groups of workers with different
productivity risks compete simultanously in the market. This corresponds more naturally to field
labor market institutions. We would also consider the implementation of upward sloping labor
supply curves to add external validity to our design. Nonetheless, even at this initial stage there
is an important message emerging from the data. Statistical discrimination can exist in many
forms, and only the most obvious forms of statistical discrimination-based on differences in
average productivity among worker-groups-are likely to be measured in field studies. Even

studies that examine distributional variance may not be capturing statistical discrimination in the
data. Productivity risk from distinct worker-groups should be a concern, and our results indicate
that current measures of statistical discrimination are predictably biased when this is not taken
into account. Specifically, statistical discrimination will be under-estimated when one ignores
more hidden forms of this type of discrimination. 3 Furthermore, measures of prejudice-based
discrimination may be over-estimated if one fails to account for the likelihood that a certain
component of unexplained wage differentials is due to a form of statistical discrimination not
usually considered. Policy prescriptions aimed at reducing discrimination in various markets
may require re-assessment if the reason behind the discrimination has a different motive than
typically thought.

3This assumes that groups with lower average productivity are the same groups that have riskier
distributions. Otherwise, these two forms of statistical discrimination would counteract each other in the date.
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FIGURE l: Experimental Design

TABLEl
EXj!erimental Treatment Design
Description
Treatment Productivity
(probability)
1
3
(LOa)
2
1,2,3,4,5
(.1,.1,.6,.1,.1)
3
1,2,3,4,5
(.2,.2,.2,.2,.2)
4
2,4
(.5,.5)

Productivity
Mean
3

Productivity
Variance
a

3

Likelihood of
Productivity
Distribution Productivity<mean
Support
Productivity
--

--

1

1-5

.20

3

2

1-5

.40

3

1

2-4

.50
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TABLE 2
Random effects estimation
Dependent Variable=Wage Contract
Full Employer
Female Employer
Male Employer
Sample (N=560)
Sample (n=320)
Sample (N=240)
Variable
Coef. (p-value)
Coef. (p-value)
Coef. (p-value)
Constant
.653 (.00)***
.723 (.00)***
.601 (.00)***
T2
-.029 (.34)
-.127 (.00)***
.045 (.28)
T3
-.078 (.01)***
-.137 (.00)***
-.035 (.41)
T4
-.115 (.00)***
-.213 (.00)***
-.041 (.32)
R2
.023
.015
.066
*,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively, for the one-tailed test

TABLE 3
Binary Comparisons Among the Uncertain Productivity Treatments
(coefficient comparisons from Table 2 results)
Full Employer
Sample
(N=560)

Male Employer
Sample
(N=240)

Female Employer
Sample
(N=320)

Comparison
Difference (P-value) Difference (P-value)
Difference (P-value)
T3-T2
-.049 (.10)*
-.010 (.81)
-.080 (.06)*
-.086 (.00)***
-.086 (.04)**
-.086 (.04)**
T4-T2
T4-T3
-.037 (.22)
-.076 (.07)*
-.006 (.89)
*,**,*** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively, for the one-tailed test.

TABLE 4
Random Effects Results
Dependent Variable=Wage Contract
Full Employer Sample Male Employer Sample
Female Employer Sample
(N=560)
(N=240)
(N=320)
Variable
coef. (p-value)
coef. (p-value)
coef. (p-value)
Constant
.653 (.00)***
.723 (.00)***
.601 (.00)***
Variance
.087 (.11)
.001 (.99)
-.064 (.23)
-.293(.11)
.313 (.08)*
Support
.053 (.68)
Loss Prob
-.252 (.00)***
-.482 (.00)***
-.079 (.51)
R2
.066
.023
.015
*,**,*** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the two-tailed test.
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APPENDIX: Statistical Design
The four treatments form an orthogonal design. Ifwe let T 1, T 2, T 3, and T4 denote
dummy variables vectors identifying the treatments, the observation matrix for the treatment
variables is simply ( T1, T2 , T3, T4). Our unit of observation is the contract, of which there are
560 wage contracts (5 employers per experimental session x 7 experimental sessions x 4
treatments per experimental session x 4 periods per treatment). Each treatment will be observed
140 times (5 employers per experimental session x 7 experimental sessions x 4 periods per
treatment). The treatment cross product matrix appears as

[

TI'TI

0

0

o

o

T2 'T2

0

140

o
o

0
0

T3 'T3
0

o
o

oo

00 ]
140 0
o 140

If, say, the first treatment variable is replaced by a vector of 1 's denoted by t, the cross product
matrix is given by

[

l'l

l'TI

l'T2

l'T;

0

l'T2

T2' T2
0

T3 'T3

o
o

l'T3

0

0

T4'T4

l'T3]

[560 140 140 140]
140 140 0
0
140

0

140

0

140

0

0

140

The implication of this design is that any characteristic of the particular employer such as age or
gender will have zero correlation with the treatment dummy variables. In particular, the set of
dummy variables identifying each of the 35 employers in the experiment will be uncorrelated
with the treatment dummy variables. This means that the estimated treatment effects will be
invariant with respect to control variables such as age, gender, and employer. The latter case is
the fixed effects model, which is demonstrated below.
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Let Y denote the vector of wage contracts, X denote the observation matrix for treatments
T2, T 3, and T4, and let D represent the observation matrix on the 35 employer dummy variables.
The simple OLS model of treatment effects with a single constant term is given by Y=/31l+Xb+8,
where l is a vector of 1 's. Without the constant term the model can be written as
Y=T 1/31+Xj3+8, where /3=b+/31 and Tl=I-T2-T3-T4. Given the orthogonality among the treatment
dummy variables, the OLS estimator of /3 is Pols

=

(X' xtl X' Y = (x' X)-I x' y, where the lower case

letters denote the variables in deviation form. Let N 1=the number of employers per experimental
session; N 2=the number of experimental sessions; N 3=the number of treatments per experimental
session; and N 4=the number of periods per treatment. Given that each employer appears exactly
N3 ·N4

times out ofa total of NI · N 2 ·N3 ·N4 observations, the mean of each employer dummy

variable is simply }(N . N 2)' Each treatment appears exactly Nl . N 2 . N 4 times. The number of
l

times a given treatment interacts with each employer is N 4, while the number of times a given
treatment does not interact with a given employer is (Nl-l)N4+N1(N2-1)N4. The term (Nl-l)N4is
the number of times the given treatment interacts with the other employers in the same
experimental session, while the term N 1(N2-1 )N4 is the number of times the given treatment
appears in the remaining experimental sessions. Let Dj denote the dummy variable for the ith
employer and let d j denote D j in deviation form. Whenever D j = 1, then d j = 1-

}(N N2) and
•

1

Weare interested in the sample covariance between any treatment Tk and employer D j :

observations involving the kth treatment and O's otherwise. These are multiplied by the

20
corresponding observation on d i which equals 1 if the observation is on employer i and 1 - 11 (N 1
. N2 ) otherwise. The sum of these products can be decomposed into 3 terms. The first term is
the value of T~di for the sum of the observations in the experiment involving both employer i and

treatment k:

T~di = N

4

(1-_1_J. The second term is the value of

N}N2

T~di for the sum of the

remaining observations in the experiment which correspond to either other employers or other
treatments: T~d. = I

N (N -1)
4

}

N}N2

•

Finally, the third term is the value of T~di for the sum of the

observations in the remaining experiments which do not involve employer i:

T'd. = - N4N} (N 2-1). Therefore, summing over all of the observations in the database shows
kIN N
}

2

that the sample covariance between any treatment Tk and employer Di is proportional to

correlation between the treatment dummy variables and the employer fixed effects. Consider the
LSDV formulation of the employer fixed effects model: Y=X8+Da+8, where D is the
observation matrix for the employer dummy variables. Given that the treatment effects in X are
uncorrelated with the employer dummy variables in D, the LSDV fixed effects estimator

Pie = Pols·

The standard errors will, in general, differ because of the presence of fixed (employer)

effects. It is clear that the treatment effect
the employer dummy variables.

p} = 15' a , where

15' is the vector of mean values of
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The same sort of reasoning shows the equivalence of OLS and random effects as well. In
fact, the identity of the random effects and the fixed effects estimators yields a value of zero for
the Hausman statistic.

